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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
V.

JOHN L. LEGG,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 20140716-CA
Appellant is incarcerated.

INTRODUCTION
This Court issued State v. Legg on April 10, 2014. See 2014 UT App 80, 324 P.3d
656 [Addendum A]. In that case, this Court considered the trial court's decision to revoke
Mr. Legg' s probation based on three violations. Id. This Court affirmed one violation,
finding that "Legg willfully violated his probation agreement by failing to be cooperative,
compliant, and truthful with his probation officer" (/d.if25), nonetheless, it remanded "for
further consideration and explanation by the trial court" of the other two violations. Id.
On remand, it required that "the trial court must reassess whether, under all the
circumstances, Legg's probation should be revoked." Id.
On remand, the state pursued only a claim that probation should remain revoked
based on the one violation this Court affirmed. R.377:9. The trial court summarily
revoked Mr. Legg's probation, noting there was '·no question that if there had been any
finding of violation of probation that it would have been revoked, pure and simply on his
history." R.377:21,23-24 (emphasis added). Mr. Legg now appeals from that decision.

JURISDICTION
Mr. Legg appeals from a July 28, 2014, sentence, judgment, and commitment for
convictions of one count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a
third degree felony under Utah Code § 76-10-503(2)(b ); and one count of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, a third degree felony under Utah Code§ 76-5-103. See

generally R.377; see also [Addendum B].
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103 (2)( e).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW . PRESERVATION

Issue: Whether the trial court violated the mandate rule and thus abused its
discretion on remand where its decision to again revoke Mr. Legg's probation did not
comply with this Court's remand order.

Standard of review: A trial court's decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See Legg, 2014 UT App 80, fl7. "The mandate rule ... binds both the
district comt and the parties to honor the mandate of the appellate court." IHC Health

Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, iI28, 196 P.3d 588.
Plain Error: To show plain error, Legg must establish that: ''"(i) An en-or exists;
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,

absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is unde1mined. '" Legg,
2014 UT App 80, ,rs (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS
Nature of the Case. Course of the Proceedings. Disposition in the Com1 Below

2

In 2011, Mr. Legg pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person (district court case no. 101901007), and one count of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (district court case no. 101901067). R.24647,248-55.1 He was sentenced to two concurrent sentences ofno less than five years in
the Utah State Prison, suspended for 180 days in jail, with twenty-four months of
probation. R.246-47. He was released from jail on probation on January 5, 2012. R.27073. Only eight days later, Adult Probation and Parole filed an affidavit in suppmi of an
order to show cause, alleging several probation violations. R.274-75. The affidavit was
amended to add additional violations. R.292-302. Mr. Legg denied all of the violations.
R305. An evidentiary hearing was subsequently held, where the trial court revoked his
probation based on three alleged probation violations. R.307-308; see also Legg, 2014
UT App 80, if6 (noting the trial court revoked probation because Mr. Legg ';(l) []
knowingly possessed a controlled substance; (2) [] failed to be cooperative, compliant,
and truthful with his probation officer; and (3) [] failed to establish a residence of
record."). Mr. Legg appealed from that decision. See 20120473-CA.
On appeal, this court affirmed only the allegation that Mr. Legg had not been
cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation officer. Legg, 2014 UT App 80,
The guilty plea to both charges is contained in one document. In the prior appeal
from these convictions, this court consolidated both district court cases into case number
20120473-CA. However, in the new appeal, only the district court record from case
101900677 was included in this appellate record. Mr. Legg has moved to supplement the
record with that record, however because that record is not dispositive of the issues on
appeal and the court can take judicial notice of the other record, the opening brief is filed
without waiting for the court's response to the motion.
3

~25. This court expressed doubt and a lack of confidence in the trial court's decisions to
revoke based on the two other charges of possession and notifying AP &P of a residence.

Jd.11I 9,23. Even as it recognized that a single violation might suffice to revoke
probation, this Court nonetheless remanded for further consideration on those two
violations, mandating that the trial court determine whether ''under all the circumstances,
Legg's probation should be revoked." Jd.,25.
On remand in the trial court hearing on July 28, 2014, a different trial comi judge
presided.2 The state dropped any claim as to the substance or residence violations.
R.377:9. It wanted to "simply move forward on the one where the Court [of Appeals] did
uphold that willful violation." Id. The pa1iies then stipulated that no evidentiary hearing
was necessary. Id. I 0. Defense counsel argued the court should close the cases and not
send Mr. Legg to prison again. Id. I 4. She noted he "is not a problem out at the prison,"
and was going to work with her on resources to help him stay out of prison. Id. Then, Mr.
Legg discussed his criminal history and why he believed the probation violation was
unjustified in that he made his best efforts to comply with AP&P's requests. ld.16-17.
The State argued the original sentence was appropriate in the prior cases based on the
';bottom line" that "he willfully violated probation," which the State saw as "enough to
impose the original sentence." Id. IS.
The trial court rejected the request to close the case, finding that it could not
';dete1mine that there has been enough time served on" the original sentences, but that it

2

The Honorable Ryan Harris ruled on the first probation revocation hearing, while
the Honorable Ann Boyden, ruled in the remand hearing.
4

was for the prison and the Board of Parole to detem1ine. ld.19-20. It nan-owed the
question before it to the question of "was there a willful violation of probation, and would
that have been sufficient" to revoke and reinstate, noting this Comi was "not confident
that standing on its own that [single violation] would have been enough to result in
revocation of probation." R.377:20. Yet the trial court decided the only reason this Court
was not "confident," was "because [it] didn't know anything." Id.
The trial court disclosed, "[i]n all fairness" and "just to assure everyone [it was]
familiar with the case," that it knew, "because of the dealing that [it] had with Mr. Legg
before, that that would have been sufficient to [] revoke probation." ld.21,23. Then and
based on its '~experience with Mr. Legg," the court mled, "there is no question that if
there had been any finding of violation of probation that it would have been revoked,
pure and simply on his history." Id. It said if it had "found a violation, looking at his
history, looking at the recommendation, looking at the opportunity for probation that he
had received, [it] would have imposed the original sentence." ld.23. The court left the
decision of how long Mr. Legg's prison sentence would go to the Board. Id.
This appeal is taken from that determination.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Legg argues the trial court abused its discretion in again revoking his

probation and reinstating his sentence, because it failed to consider and analyze the
circumstances surrounding his probation, and instead affirmed the probation revocation
based on extraneous and irrelevant concerns. In so doing, the trial com1 failed to abide by
this Court's mandate to undertake "further consideration and explanation" as to '~whether,
5

under all the circumstances, ~egg's probation should be revoked," on the basis of a single
violation for "failing to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation
officer." Legg, 2014 UT App 80, 125.
The trial court failed to consider the circumstances surrounding that single
violation and failed to explain why, despite the com1 of appeals' hesitation to affirm Mr.
Legg' s probation revocation on that single violation, it was nonetheless a sufficient basis
to reinstate his prison sentence. This Comi should reverse and remand for appropriate
findings by the trial court.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE MANDATE RULE \VHEN
IT REVOKED MR. LEGG'S PROBATION \VITHOUT
COMPLYING \VITH THE COURT OF APPEALS' MANDATE ON
REMAND.

The trial comi violated the mandate rule in its dete1mination of this case on
remand. The mandate rule ';binds both the district court and the parties to honor the
mandate of the appellate cou1i." IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2008 UT 73, 128. Moreover, the
mandate rule, '"dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a
case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that
case."' Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 112, 218 P.3d 583 (quoting Thurston
v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995)). Indeed, that rule requires
that a ';lower court must implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking
into account the appellate comi's opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Thurston,
892 P.2d at 1038. On remand from this Court's decision in Legg, 2014 UT App 80, the
6

trial comi did not comply with the mandate rule where it failed to implement this Comi' s
mandate as it again revoked Mr. Legg's probation.
In Legg, this Comi reviewed the trial comi's original decision to revoke probation
for Mr. Legg's "failure to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful." Legg, 2014 UT App
80, ,Iif20-2 l. Although this Comi dete1mined the trial court "did not explicitly reveal the
evidence relied on or its reasoning in reaching this conclusion," this Comi dete1mined the
basis was nonetheless clear from the record.Id.,r21. This Court concluded "[t]he evidence
was sufficient to reasonably conclude that Legg knew he was supposed to call, that he
had the means to call, and that his failure to consistently do so was willful." Id. It
';affirm[ ed] the finding that Legg willfully violated his probation agreement by failing to
be cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation officer." Id.,I25.
Impmiantly, even as it recognized "that a single violation of probation is legally
sufficient to support a probation revocation," this Court nonetheless refused to affirm Mr.
Legg's probation violation from that single violation. Id.,rI 1. Noting the original trial
court had "expressed qualms ... about the revocation decision," this Court determined it
had been ';the totality of the three violations found by the trial court that prompted the
trial court's decision to revoke notwithstanding its misgivings." Id. And that because the
record did not make clear that "the trial court would have exercised its discretion the
same way if any one of the three violations was not properly established" Id. There was
an insufficient basis in the record for the trial court's findings on two of the violations
and this Court was "not confident that, standing on its own, the single violation ... would
have resulted in a revocation of probation." Id.,r25. The court remanded. Id.

7

On remand, this Court's mandate was clear. The Court had no confidence that a
decision to revoke probation based on Mr. Legg's relatively minor failure to contact his
probation officer on five of the seven days he was on probation, would be justified. See

Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ,16 (noting "Legg's probation officer 'had an awful quick trigger
on Mr. Legg in this case."'). With this lack of confidence, the court remanded with strict
orders to "reassess whether, under all the circumstances, Legg's probation should be
revoked." Id. ,I25. The Court's reference to "under all the circumstances" necessarily
refen-ed to the circumstances surrounding these cases and the decision to revoke
probation based on these allegations. Id. The Comt made it clear that on remand, the trial
court had to ensure the record reflected the evidence it relied on to make its decision. See
id. ,I16 (quoting State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,275 (Utah Ct.App.1990)).
The context of the remand differed somewhat from what the Com1 anticipated,
where the State dropped all allegations of the two violations this Court did not affirm and
moved fo1ward "on only the one where the Comi did uphold that willful violation."
R.377:9. Even with this change, the mandate rule still applied to the trial comt's
consideration of whether Mr. Legg's probation should have been revoked on only that
violation. See IHC Health Sen's., Inc., 2008 UT 73, 128 (a trial court is bound '·to honor
the mandate of the appellate court."); see also Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 112 (trial court "must
implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate
court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces") (quotation omitted).
The Court of Appeals' mandate meant that the trial comi had to look critically at
the circumstances of the probation to detennine whether it should again be revoked in the
8

face of a single, weak, probation violation. If it found that probation should still be
revoked, it had to make clear on the record the justifications for that decision. That
mandate did not allow the district com1 to simply assume a single violation sufficed to
violate Mr. Legg's probation and reinstate a prison sentence.
However, and despite the mandate rule, the court made that assumption and failed
'"the letter and the spirit of' this Com1's mandate. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, if 12. Despite the
Court of Appeals' clear expression of concern that the single violation was not enough to
revoke Legg's probation, the trial court nonetheless decided "[t]here is no question that if
there had been any finding of violation of probation that it would have been revoked. It's
pure and simply on his history." R.377:21. After defense counsel made further argument,
the trial cout1 clarified the basis for its ruling on remand:
There is no question that had I found a violation, looking at his history,
looking at the recommendation, looking at the opportunity for probation
that he had received, I would have imposed the original sentence. . .. my
finding is that on a single violation, his history, and the recommendations
and the requests of the prosecution I'm sure would have resulted in
revocation of probation. And if there is no question, and there does not
appear to be on knowingness of a violation then the only question remains
is was the revocation of probation sufficient on that one single violation and
I have no question that that would have been my ruling and that I find that
those circumstances still supp011 it.
R.377:23-25. The Court ultimately justified its finding as being "based on what
information the court had at the time that there was a finding a violation of probation that
it was properly a basis for revoking probation, looking at the entire history of both cases."

9

ld.25. In other words, the trial court simply reiterated the first court's determination of a
probation violation based the "information the court had at the time." Id.
This decision did not implement the mandate of the Comt of Appeals, in that it
does not reflect a critical evaluation of the circumstances smTounding Mr. Legg's
probation to determine whether it should again be revoked in the face of a single, weak,
probation violation. Rather the trial cou11's ruling reflects the assumption based on some
idea of the "entire history of both cases," and that it was properly revoked in the first
place, that Mr. Legg' s probation should again be revoked.
Not only was this ruling not compliant with the mandate rule but it was based on
something other than a ';permissible ground[] supported by the evidence." Black v.

Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 614 (1985); see also Hodges, 798 P.2d at 275 (the record
';strongly suggests that appellant's probation was revoked because of problems not within
his control."). On remand, it was not Legg's entire criminal history or the trial court's
professed familiarity with him, that was at issue. Yet that was the basis of the court's
decision. See R.377:21 (trial com1 noting, "[i]n all fairness I know, because of the
dealings that I have had with Mr. Legg before, that that would have been sufficient to.
um, revoke probation."). Rather, the only question was whether this single, weak
violation, in the context of Mr. Legg's cun-ent cases and the probation conditions, "would
have resulted in a revocation of probation." Legg, 2014 UT App 80, 125.
The trial court failed to comply with this Court's mandate to consider the actual
circumstances of probation in Mr. Legg's cases. Where the trial court strayed from the
mandate and revoked probation based on personal familiarity with Legg and its purpo11ed
10

but unexplained history with him, its ruling did not comply with the mandate rule and this
Com1 should reverse and remand to the trial com1 for appropriate findings.

It was plain error for the trial court to revoke Mr. Legg's probation in
violation of the mandate rule.
It was plain error to revoke Mr. Legg's probation in violation of the mandate rule.
Because all three requirements of plain error are satisfied, this Court can review Legg's
claim. See State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, 16, 18 P.3d 1123 (requiring: (1) an error; (2)
that is or should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) is prejudicial). As discussed
above, it was error for the trial court to revoke Mr. Legg's probation based the findings it
articulated. See R.377:23-24. Those findings did not reflect the mandate of this Court in
its directions for remand. See Legg, 2014 UT App 80. Given the fact of the Court of
Appeals' explicit mandate, the trial court's ruling Hwas so obvious and fundamental."
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,17, 10 P.3d 346'; -

The second element of the plain error doctrine is also satisfied. To establish that an
error was "obvious," the appellant "must show that the law governing the error was clear
at the time the alleged error was made." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ,16, 95 P.3d 276.
The mandate rule has long been recognized and was in full effect at the time of this
court's ruling. See, e.g., IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,28.
Finally, the trial court's errors ham1ed Legg, as his probation was unjustly revoked
again on an insufficient basis. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ii 13 (a hannful error is one.
where '"absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undem1ined."
11

(quotation omitted)). Thus, Legg asserts, this Court should again reverse and remand to
the trial court with directions to consider its mandate on remand.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Legg respectfully requests that this Court reverse
and remand with orders that the trial court comply with its mandate on remand.
S'°

SUBMITTED this_\_ day of April, 2015.
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JOANNA°E. LANDAU
~ttorney for Defendant/Appellant
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2014 UT App 80

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
JOHN L. LEGG JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20120473-CA
Filed April 10, 2014
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Ryan M. Harris
No. 101900677
Joanna E. Landau, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Jeanne B. Inouye, Attorneys
for A ppellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.
ORME, Judge:
John L. Legg Jr. appeals the trial court's decision to revoke
his probation and impose the original sentence on his convictions
for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a third degree
felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (LexisNexis 2012), and for
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third
degree felony, id.§ 76-10-503. Because of concerns we have with the
revocation decision, we remand for further consideration by the
trial court.
<j{l

State v. Legg

BACKGROUND
<j{2
In reviewing a revocation of probation, we recite the facts in
the "light most favorable to the trial court's findings." State v.
Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). Here, the trial court's
findings were made orally from the bench and were relatively
sparse. Thus, our recitation of the facts also includes findings
implicitly made by the trial court and matters that are undisputed
in the record.
<j{3
The day he completed the jail term that was a component of
his probation, Legg met with his probation officer to go over his
probation agreement. Legg was particularly concerned about the
requirement in the agreement that he establish a residence of
record. He told the probation officer he was homeless and had no
savings. The probation officer instructed Legg to check in by
telephone every day until he established a residence. Legg claimed
that he did not remember any such instruction, but it is undisputed
that Legg failed to call on most days. After about a week, however,
Legg showed up for a scheduled in-person interview with his
probation officer and was arrested for suspected probation
violations.
<j{4
During a search incident to the arrest, Legg's probation
officer discovered a very small amount of cocaine-less than onetenth of a normal dose-in the bottom of a pill bottle where Legg
was storing his prescription medicine. A family member gave the
pill bottle to Legg so he would have a more convenient method for
storing his pills than in the bulky containers provided to him by jail
personnel upon his release. He claimed to have never noticed the
thirty-four to thirty-six milligrams of white substance in the bottle
even though, on a regular basis, he "dumped" the pills out to take
them as prescribed and returned the remaining contents to the
bottle. A drug test administered at the same time showed that Legg
had not been using cocaine. Nevertheless, the State initiated a
separate criminal proceeding against Legg for possession of a

20120473-CA
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controlled substance. In the ensuing triat the jury rehtrned a
verdict of not guilty.
15
During the subsequent evidentiary hearing to consider
revoking Legg' s probation, which is the subject of this appeal, the
trial court heard testimony from the probation officer and from
Legg and considered the physical evidence of the cocaine. The trial
court found, with our emphasis, that it was "more likely than not
that [Legg] would know that there was a substance in there,
whatever it was." Legg's attorney pointed out that, in order to find
a violation, the court had to be convinced that Legg had knowledge
of the narcotic character of the substance, not just that he had
control over it and had knowledge of its presence, "whatever it
was." Without identifying any additional evidence, the trial court
then immediately revised its finding: "I think at least by a
preponderance I'm going to find that Mr. Legg knew that that was
a controlled substance in the bottle[.]"

16

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that
Legg had violated the terms of his probation in three ways: (1) he
knowingly possessed a controlled substance; (2) he failed to be
cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation officer; and
(3) he failed to establish a residence of record. In doing so,
however, the trial court expressed concerns about revoking
probation so quickly and opined that Legg' s probation officer "had
an awful quick trigger on Mr. Legg in this case."

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

17

Legg argues that the trial court did not properly focus on the
requirement that probation violations must be willful and that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that any violation of
the probation agreement was willful. We review a trial court's
decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990).

20120473-CA
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<_II8
Legg did not preserve this issue for appeal but argues that
the trial court was plainly in error in not focusing on the
requirement of willfulness. Plain error is established only if: "(i)An
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
<_II9
Legg also asserts that he had ineffective assistance of
counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, when raised on
appeal for the first time, presents a question of law. See State v.
Clark, 2004 UT 25, <JI 6, 89 P.3d 162.

ANALYSIS
<J[lO To revoke probation, the trial court must find a violation of
the probation agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. State
v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In addition, the
trial court must find, also by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the violation was willful, see State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, <j[ 24,
997 P.2d 314, and not merely the result of circumstances beyond the
probationer's control, see State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,277 (Utah Ct.
App.1990).
We recognize that a single violation of probation is legally
sufficient to support a probation revocation. See Jameson, 800 P.2d
at 804 ("The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in the
discretion of the trial court."). But considering the expressed
qualms of the trial court about the revocation decision, it is
appropriate to address each finding individually. And because it
appears to have been the totality of the three violations found by
the trial court that prompted the trial court's decision to revoke
notwithstanding its misgivings, it is less than obvious in this case
that the trial court would have exercised its discretion the same
way if any one of the three violations was not properly established.
<j[ll
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I. Possession of a Controlled Substance

<j{l2 Legg argues that there was insufficient evidence to show
that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance. To prove
possession of a controlled substance in violation of Utah Code
section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), the State must establish "that the accused
exercised dominion and control over the drug with knowledge of
its presence and narcotic character." State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872,
874 (Utah 1964). Accord State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
<jl:13 The record is more than sufficient to show, at least by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Legg exercised dominion and
control over the substance in his pill bottle that later proved to be
cocaine and that he had knowledge of its physical presence. He had
exclusive control over the pill bottle for about a week, and the trial
court did not exceed its discretion in inferring that by "dumping"
out the pills on a regular basis it was more likely than not that Legg
had knowledge of its presence. It is less clear, however, that Legg
had knowledge of the substance's narcotic character. This is an
essential element of the violation. If Legg had no idea what the
substance at the bottom of his pill bottle was, then it cannot be said
that he willfully violated his probation agreement by possessing a
controlled substance. Counsel below was correct in raising a timely
concern with the court that it was not enough to find that Legg
knew the substance, "whatever it was," was in the pill bottle.
Instead, the trial court needed to find that Legg also knew of the
narcotic character of the substance in order to conclude that Legg
violated the terms of his probation.
<jl:14 The trial court acknowledged this and amended its finding
to include that Legg had the requisite knowledge, but it did so
without any reference to evidence on which it may have relied or
the rationale for its immediately revised reasoning. Legg's
argument about the insufficiency of the evidence in this regard is
well taken. Most tellingly, at one point in the hearing, Legg's
counsel complained that there was no basis for assuming that Legg
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would be able to identify cocaine residue because "there has never
been any evidence that he has a history with cocaine." In response,
the State conceded, "We didn't bring that out in any of this."
However, before we can properly address the issue of insufficient
evidence, we must first determine if the trial court revealed its
reasoning and the evidence upon which it relied in a way that
satisfies the due process requirements of a probation revocation
hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).
'1115 In Gagnon, the United States Supreme Court held that the
minimum due process protections applicable to probation
revocation proceedings include "' a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking
[probation]."' Id. (quoting Morrisse11 v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972), and extending Morrissey's parole revocation rule to
probation hearings). The Court has explained that the "written
statement required by Gagnon . . . helps to insure accurate
factfinding with respect to any alleged violation and provides an
adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on
permissible grounds supported by the evidence." Blackv. Romano,
471 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1985). But when a probation revocation
hearing is recorded, a written finding is "constitutionally required
only if the transcript and record before the judge do not enable a
reviewing court to determine the basis of the judge's decision to
revoke probation." Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207,210 (10th Cir.
1983). If the "evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking"
probation are not revealed, then a remand for a rehearing is
appropriate. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
<j[16 In Hodges, the record contained some evidence supporting
probation revocation, but other evidence-letters from a social
worker and a corrections supervisor-was absent from the record
on appeal. Id. at 273. In its finding, the trial court in Hodges did not
make it clear how much it had relied on the missing letters and
how much it had relied on the other evidence. Id. at 274. We
remanded because "[t]he record on review [did] not adequately
reveal the evidence relied on by the court." Id. at 275.

20120473-CA

6

2014 UT App 80

State v. Legg

'1[17 As in Hodges, the record and transcript available in this case
do not readily reveal the evidence relied on or the reasons for
finding that Legg willfully possessed a controlled substance with
knowledge of its narcotic character. The trial court originally found
only that Legg had control of the substance, "whatever it was," and
that, more likely than not, he was aware of its presence. After
Legg' s counsel objected, the trial court promptly revised its
findings to meet the applicable legal requirement, but it failed to
give any indication of its basis for doing so.
'1[18 The State directs us to a confidential competency evaluation
ordered by a trial court in a previous matter as evidence of Legg' s
familiarity with cocaine. During the court-ordered competency
evaluation, Legg made potentially incriminating statements to a
social worker. The trial court did not reveal if it relied on this
evidence or not, although it apparently was among the voluminous
materials before the court.
'1[19 Because we cannot determine from the record what
evidence, if any, the trial court relied on in finding that Legg had
knowledge of the narcotic character of the substance in his pill
bottle, we cannot conclude that Legg willfully violated his
probation. We therefore remand to the trial court to identify the
evidence it relied on and its reason for moving so quickly from a
finding of "whatever it was" to a finding of knowledge that the
substance was cocaine. See Black, 471 U.S. at 613-14 (holding that
without a finding from the trial court detailing the evidence relied
on and the reasons for probation revocation, there will not be "an
adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on
permissible grounds supported by the evidence").

II. Failure To Be Cooperative, Compliant, and Truthful
<J:[20 Legg argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he
willfully failed to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his
probation officer. The probation officer testified that he instructed
Legg to check in by telephone every day until he established a
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residence. Legg failed to do so. The State produced evidence that
Legg could have called every day if he had wanted to do so. While
it may have been inconvenient at times, Legg admitted that he did
have access to telephones. It is also clear that Legg had the correct
telephone number for his probation officer because he called and
left two messages on the second day of his probation. The trial
court found the probation officer's testimony to be more reliable
and ruled that Legg' s failure to call was a willful violation of his
probation agreement.
<_II21 Again, the trial court did not explicitly reveal the evidence
relied on or its reasoning in reaching this conclusion, see supra '1[ 19,
but on this issue the evidence and statements contained in the
record make the evidentiary basis for this finding sufficient!y clear.
See Morishita v. Morris, 621 P.2d 691, 693 n.2 (Utah 1980) ("[T]he
transcript, in which many statements by the judge appear, reveals
the judge's thought process and the conclusions he drew from the
evidence. An entry of formal findings of fact and conclusions of law
would add nothing[.]"). Concerning the first prong of the plain
error test, we do not conclude that the trial court made any error,
plain or otherwise, in connection with this ruling. See State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). The evidence was sufficient to
reasonably conclude that Legg knew he was supposed to call, that
he had the means to call, and that his failure to consistently do so
was willful. See State v. Brady, 2013 UT App 102, c_[ 7,300 P.3d 778
(concluding that fin~ings of willfulness in the probation revocation
context can be implicit).
III. Failure To Establish a Residence
<_II22 Legg argues that the court plainly erred because the
evidence was insufficient to show that he willfully failed to
establish a residence of record. Legg argues that the trial court
based its finding solely on the undisputed fact that Legg remained
homeless after one week of probation. If this was, in fact, the trial
court's reasoning, then it may have plainly erred. If an "appellant's
failure . . . resulted from problems beyond his control, his
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probation cannot be revoked." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 277
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). On appeal, however, the State argues that the
requirement to call every day was an accommodation to Legg that
effectively replaced the requirement that he establish a residence of
record. This allowed Legg to remain transient so long as he
reported his temporary "residence of record" every night.
<j[23 The trial court, however, did not explain whether it found
the violation to be the result of Legg's failure to establish a
residence of record or whether it found the violation to be the
result of Legg' s failure to call in with updated "residence"
information every night. It certainly appears that it was the former,
although the trial court cut short any opportunity to flesh out the
basis for this claimed violation. The judge stated:
I think I can find based on the evidence that has been
presented today that Mr. Legg did fail to establish a
residence of record and that ... he did fail to be
cooperative, compliant and truthful with certain
dealings .... So I'm going to make a finding without
even hearing from you folks on argument ... that
those two have been violated.
This finding leaves us without "adequate basis for review to
determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported
by the evidence." See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1985).
Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to identify the facts on
which it relied in concluding that Legg willfully failed to establish
a residence of record.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Cj{24 Legg argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his trial counsel failed to object to the trial court's
revocation of probation without sufficient evidence of the
willfulness of Legg' s violations. We conclude that trial counsel's
failure to object to the finding that Legg violated his probation by
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failing to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful with his probation
officer-i.e., by not calling his probation officer on most days-was
not ineffective. As previously discussed, see supra 'JI 21, the record
and transcript support the trial court's finding on this point,
meaning an objection would have been unavailing. "Failure to raise
futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, <j[ 26, 1 P.3d 546. As a result,
we conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective in this regard.
And because we have already remanded for reconsideration on the
remaining issues, it is unnecessary to address the effectiveness of
counsel with respect to those issues.

CONCLUSION

i25 We affirm the finding that Legg willfully violated his
probation agreement by failing to be cooperative, compliant, and
truthful with his probation officer. But we are not confident that,
standing on its own, the single violation that we affirm would have
resulted in a revocation of probation. We remand on the issues of
possession of a controlled substance and failure to establish a
residence of record for further consideration and explanation by
the trial court. On remand, the trial court must reassess whether,
under all the circumstances, Legg's probation should be revoked.

Q
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Utah Code§ 76-5-103
76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1)

A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and uses:
(a)

a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or

(b)

other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

(a)

A violation of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony, except under
Subsection (2)(b ).

(b)

A violation of Subsection ( 1) that results in serious bodily injury is a
second degree felony.

(2)

